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to Foster the Internal Market for eComms? (*) 
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Cullen International, Namur 
Alexandre de STREEL 
University of Namur, and CRIDS 
 
 
Abstract: This paper analyses when EU intervention is needed to achieve this internal 
market for electronic communications. It sets legal and economic criteria to determine the 
appropriate scope of the EU intervention. It applies these criteria to several case studies 
and concludes that sometimes the EU intervention is not always justified (such as 
regulation of mobile termination rate, price control of Next Generation Access networks), 
whereas in other cases EU intervention is justified (entry regulation, international roaming, 
spectrum). The paper calls for a more open debate of the concept and the means to 
achieve the digital internal market. It also submits that EU intervention should focus on the 
areas where its benefits are the highest (in particular given the possibilities of economies 
of scale provided by the technology or the cross-country externalities), and where its costs 
are the lowest (in particular given the heterogeneity of national preferences or the need for 
regulatory experimentation and competition). In particular, this paper calls the Commission 
to use its new power on regulatory remedies with extreme caution, especially in the 
context of the deployment of NGA, given the uncertainty on the best form of regulation. 
Key words: electronic communications, internal market, regulation, subsidiarity, fiscal 
federalism. 
 
any European Commission policy initiatives and independent 
studies, of which this special issue of Communications & 
Strategies is an example, show a renewed interest in the progress 
towards the achievement of the internal market for digital services, 
whether on the content part (e.g. electronic commerce or e-government 
services) or on the infrastructure part (i.e. electronic communications 
networks and services). The Digital agenda for Europe, one of the seven 
                     
(*) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 30th Anniversary Conference of the 
CRID held in Namur (Belgium) on 21 January 2010 and has benefited from the comments of the 
participants. The authors would also like to thank Peter Dunn, Robert Queck, Martin Schraa and 
two anonymous referees of the Review for their very useful comments. 
M 
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flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy for jobs and growth, places 
the internal market at its core. 1 Some of the 12 key actions of the recently 
adopted Single Market Act of the Commission should contribute to the digital 
single market. 2 Among the independent studies, the Monti Report on the 
internal market recommends several actions to shape Europe's digital single 
market. 3 According to Copenhagen Economics (2010), the EU could gain 
4 % of GDP by stimulating the digital internal market by 2020. This 
corresponds to a gain of almost € 500 bn and means that the digital single 
market alone could have a similar impact to the famous Delors 1992 internal 
market programme. 
To achieve such an internal market, several policies will be needed at the 
national and the EU levels. It is important that the EU intervention takes 
place where it is most useful; otherwise it may be counter-productive and 
waste the EU's "political capital", which has decreased over the years. 
Unfortunately in the past, the Commission sometimes intervened where, we 
would submit, it was not appropriate, whereas the Council opposed EU 
intervention in other areas where it was justified. 
Accordingly, this paper identifies areas where EU intervention is justified 
and areas where national freedom of action would be more appropriate. The 
next Section explains our concept of the internal market with its implication 
for public policies, and then sets legal and economic criteria to base EU 
intervention. 4 The following Section puts forward some cases where EU 
intervention may be, according to us, over intrusive or other cases where EU 
intervention may be justified. 
                     
1 Communication from the Commission of 26 August 2010, A Digital Agenda for Europe, 
COM(2010) 245/2. 
2 Communication from the Commission of 13 April 2011, The Single Market Act, COM(2011) 
206. 
3 MONTI, 2010, pp. 44-46. With regard to telecommunications services and infrastructures, the 
Report recommends proposals for creating a seamless regulatory space for electronic 
communications, including proposals to reinforce EU level regulatory oversight, to introduce 
pan-European licensing and EU level frequency allocation and administration. 
4 This paper does not deal with the different types of possible institutional coordination for the 
EU intervention ranging from weak to strong coordination : ad-hoc discussion of issues of 
common interest and/or mere exchange of information between national regulators; Euro-
regulators with soft power (voluntary guidelines) and consensus decision making; Euro-
regulators with hard power (binding rules) and qualified majority voting, Commission with 
softlaw; Commission with binding legislation, possibly after the opinion of the BEREC. On those 
categories, see Commission Services Impact Assessment of 28 June 2006 on the Review of 
EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, SEC(2006)817, 
pp. 19-21; and NICOLAIDES, 2006, p. 5. 
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  The internal market in electronic communications  
and the optimal level of regulation 
When dealing with the internal market, two related issues should be 
distinguished. First, what is the internal market and what does it imply for 
public policies at national and EU level? Secondly, when is EU intervention 
justified to achieve the internal market? 
The concept of the internal market in electronic communications  
and the required public policies for its establishment 
Article 26(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) states that:  
"The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties." 
The achievement of such internal market requires some public policies at 
the national as well as at the EU levels. We can find some indications in 
Article 8(3) of the amended Framework Directive5, which provides that: 
"The national regulatory authorities shall contribute to the development 
of the internal market by inter alia: 
- removing remaining obstacles to the provision of electronic 
communications networks, associated facilities and services and 
electronic communications services at European level; 
- encouraging the establishment and development of trans-European 
networks and the interoperability of pan-European services, and end-
to-end connectivity; 
- cooperating with each other, with the Commission and BEREC so as 
to ensure the development of consistent regulatory practice and the 
consistent application of this Directive and the Specific Directives." 
More generally, the national and EU policies necessary to achieve the 
internal market for public policy need to be debated further between 
stakeholders but, at this stage, we argue that the conditions and policies for 
                     
5 Directive 2002/21 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002] 
L 108/33, as amended by Directive 2009/140. 
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the achievement of the internal market in the electronic communications 
networks and services are: 
• The removal of all barriers to entry between the Member States and 
the establishment of conditions which are sufficiently harmonised such that 
operators and consumers may benefit from the economies of scale (e.g. low 
cost mobile handsets available thanks to harmonised technical standards). 
• A level playing field and strict non-discrimination between all players, 
being national or foreign, incumbent or new entrant, together with a high 
level of transparency on terms and conditions for access to key wholesale 
services, allowing effective competition.  
• The presence of regulators which are independent of operators, to 
ensure the application of the non-discrimination and transparency rules, and 
of national governments. 
However, the achievement of the internal market should not lead to the 
negation of national preferences and choices which are not contrary to the 
conditions defined above as necessary for the achievement of the internal 
market.  
Such national preferences and choices may relate to economic 
regulatory issues where theoretical and policy debates exist, such as 
infrastructure versus service-based competition, the need and the speed for 
achieving the symmetry of termination charges, or the need of entry 
assistance measures such as national roaming are needed. An old example 
where the impact of the differences of national preferences on the internal 
market has been exaggerated is the 1998 Numbering Directive. 6 This 
Directive imposed on the Member States an obligation to implement Carrier 
Pre-Selection (CPS) by 2000. The United Kingdom, with a tradition of 
infrastructure-based competition, strongly opposed CPS as it was removing 
an incentive for operators to invest in local loops. The UK was outvoted in 
the Council and was forced to implement CPS. Whether the UK was right to 
oppose CPS is a matter of opinion. What is difficult to understand is why the 
British preference for a stronger incentive to investment in the local loop was 
an obstacle to the achievement of the internal market and why the country 
had to be brought into line.  
                     
6 Directive 98/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 
amending Directive 97/33 with regard to operator number portability and carrier pre-selection, 
OJ [1998] L 268/37. 
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National preferences may also relate to social policies. Thus, it is 
appropriate to let the Member States decide on the scope of the digital 
services of general economic interest they want to make affordable to their 
citizens, as long as it does not affect competition. 7  
Moreover, the achievement of the internal market should not be expected 
to lead to the harmonisation of prices. 8 Indeed, national differences in 
population density, GDP per capita, industry history and structure, consumer 
preferences and the fact that most electronic communications services are 
not tradable between Member States (thereby impeding any possibility of 
arbitrage) will inevitably result in differences in prices. To be sure, the prices 
of electronic communications services are geographically averaged across 
the national territory in most Member States although there are regional cost 
differences between, say, urban and countryside areas. However, this 
similarity in price is due to a political decision to impose geographic tariff 
averaging for social and territorial cohesion reasons among each Member 
State. The level of solidarity at EU level cannot justify a similar EU 
averaging. Furthermore, operators throughout the EU have different 
ownership which would make the administration of tariff averaging more 
complex. 
The justification of an intervention at the EU level 
The second issue is to determine when an intervention at the EU level is 
justified to achieve the internal market. 
The legal criteria 
In EU law, an intervention at the European level is justified when it 
passes two cumulative tests, the legal basis test (in particular the legal basis 
related to the internal market) and the subsidiarity test. 9 The legal basis test 
                     
7 Finland was the first EU Member State to include a broadband connection at 1Mbps in the 
definition of universal service. 
8 In this sense also, see the Opinion of Advocate General Poaires Maduro in Case C-58/08, 
The Queen (on the application of Vodafone and others) v. Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (International Roaming Regulation), ECR [2010] I-0000, 
para.32. 
9 We do not deal here with the principle of proportionality of Article 5(4) TEU because it is not 
related to the existence or the possibility to exercise EU competence, but to the manner this 
competence should be exercised. 
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determines whether the EU has a competence to act, whereas the 
subsidiarity test determines whether the existing competence may be 
exercised, hence the former precedes the latter. 
The legal basis for internal market, Article 114(1) TFEU 10, provides that: 
"The European Parliament and the Council shall (…) adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market." 
In the International roaming Regulation case, 11 the Court of Justice 
interpreted this provision with a reasonably restrained economic 
interpretation: 
"32. According to consistent case-law the object of measures adopted 
on the basis of Article [114(1) TFEU] must genuinely be to improve the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
[…]. While a mere finding of disparities between national rules and the 
abstract risk of infringements of fundamental freedoms or distortion of 
competition is not sufficient to justify the choice of Article [114 TFEU] 
as a legal basis, the Community legislature may have recourse to it in 
particular where there are differences between national rules which are 
such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct 
effect on the functioning of the internal market […] or to cause 
significant distortions of competition […]. " 
33. Recourse to that provision is also possible if the aim is to prevent 
the emergence of such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent 
development of national laws. However, the emergence of such 
obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be 
designed to prevent them […].  
The Court of Justice followed the same line of reasoning in the ENISA 
case, the other case where the limits of Article 114 TFEU were tested in the 
electronic communications sector, by judging that 12: 
"42. […] that provision is used as a legal basis only where it is actually 
and objectively apparent from the legal act that its purpose is to 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market." 
                     
10 On internal market, see CHALMERS et al., 2010. 
11 Case C 58/08, International Roaming Regulation. 
12 Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. European Commission and Council, ECR [2006] I-3771, 
para. 42 
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If the legal basis test is met, then the subsidiarity test should be 
conducted. Article 5(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) provides 
that: 
"[…] the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level." 
On the basis of those tests, two observations may be made: 
• First, the relationship between the legal basis test and the subsidiarity 
test is complex because both tests have different objectives (determine 
whether there is an EU competence, and then whether this competence may 
be exercised), but the same elements may be considered to pass both tests. 
This was clear in the International roaming regulation case where the trans-
national aspect of international roaming was considered both in the legal 
basis and in the subsidiarity tests. 
• Second, both tests give some flexibility to the EU institutions to 
determine their competences. To use this flexibility in the most efficient way, 
some economic criteria may be useful, on which we now turn. 
The economic criteria 
To determine the economic criteria justifying an efficient EU intervention, 
we apply the theory of fiscal federalism which is the mainstream economic 
theory to determine efficiently the optimal level of governance and public 
intervention (ALESINA, ANGELONI & SCHUKNECHT, 2005; OATES, 1999, 
2005; PELKMANS, 2005; TABELLINI, 2003. For an application in 
telecommunications, see BARROS, 2004; CAVE & CROWTHER, 1996; 
HAUCAP, 2009a: 466-472; NICOLAIDES, 2006). According to this theory, 
there are several benefits to centralisation (i.e. EU intervention) which are of 
substantive and institutional nature. 
The substantive benefits are: 13 
• The internalisation of the cross-country externalities; there is such 
externality when the regulation (or the absence of regulation) in country A 
has significant effect on the welfare of the consumers and/or firms in 
                     
13 We do not deal with the issue of regulatory race to the bottom, rarely applicable in the sector 
as the electronic communications networks and services are not tradable across countries. 
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country B and that effect will not be taken into account by the regulator of 
country A. One example is the regulation of international roaming. 
• The costs saved by regulated operators with the elimination of 
regulatory duplication (one-stop-shopping or home-country control). An 
example of this would be a single EU authorisation procedure. 
• The economies of scale and transaction costs saved by NRAs in the 
design of regulation and the implementation of such regulation. An example 
would be a common approach to cost auditing. 
The institutional benefits are: 
• The additional commitment and coherence as a centralised authority 
may be more independent and less prone to capture by local operators and 
governments. 
• The institutional support for small or weak local regulators which may 
lack empowerment, skills, independence or accountability. 
Besides reasons of economic efficiency, centralisation may also be 
justified for social motives. For instance, the averaging of telecom tariffs 
within a given Member State is justified for territorial cohesion. 
However, centralisation also has some substantive or institutional costs. 
The substantive costs are due to: 
• The heterogeneity of preferences and choices for economic or for 
social policies; a case in point is the different scope of the services of 
general economic interest among Member States. 
• The heterogeneity of natural and historical endowments, such as 
speed and history of infrastructure deployment, spectrum allocation, market 
structures. 
• The removal of the possibility for regulatory experimentation and 
innovation to detect and then possibly converge towards the most efficient 
form of regulation (ERG, 2006, p. 11). Allowing such experimentation is 
particularly essential when there is uncertainty about the appropriate 
regulation and the potential trade-off between competition and regulation. 
This is the case in sectors with technological rapid evolution such as 
electronic communications. For instance, the following concepts have been 
developed in one Member State and then copied in several others, and 
some became part of EU law: carrier (pre-)selection, interconnection 
charges based on Long Run Incremental Cost (LRIC), local loop unbundling, 
wholesale line rental, third-party billing, interconnection capacity based 
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charging (FRIACO), national roaming, or geographical market segmentation. 
The cost associated with the lack of regulatory experimentation due to 
premature harmonisation is sometimes forgotten in studies. 14  
Institutional costs arise because: 
• The institutional capabilities and resources are often heterogeneous 
among Member States, in particular regulators of smaller Member states 
tend to have smaller financial and human resources, which may require the 
need for regulation that is simpler to implement (Ovum/Indepen, 2005: 
Section 6).  
• The information asymmetry is usually higher at the central level than 
at the local level, for instance for cost information. For instance, violation of 
the principle of non-discrimination often concerns practical issues of details 
for which a national regulator is better placed to collect the relevant 
evidence.  
• Accountability is, in some cases, lower at the central level than at local 
level. 
• Central procedures have a lower responsiveness and flexibility than 
local procedures. 
• Centralisation risks creating an additional (central) layer of regulation 
without removing the local level of regulation, leading to more regulation and 
additional complexity (Eurostrategies / Cullen International,1999).  
Thus, for each policy, or part of an overall policy, the benefits and the 
costs of centralisation should be balanced to determine the optimal level of 
regulation. 15 Often that choice is not always clear cut and may entail trade-
offs among efficiency arguments or between efficiency and social 
arguments. Moreover, this choice is complicated by an endogeneity (i.e. 
circularity) issue because, if the costs and benefits of centralisation should 
determine the optimal level of governance, the decided level of governance 
will in turn influence the costs and benefits of centralisation. Indeed in some 
cases, centralisation may stimulate additional central economic activities 
which, in turn, will justify more centralisation. 
                     
14 For instance European Evaluation Consortium (2007, pp. 21-24) does a cost-benefit analysis 
of the harmonisation of remedies without taking into account the benefit of regulatory 
experimentation. 
15 Note that in general, industry is less keen of centralisation than the Commission. 
Eurostrategies/Cullen International, 1999; Hogan & Hartson and Analysys, 2006, p. 91. 
ALESINA, ANGELONI & ETRO, 2001, discuss the possibility of centralisation bias in the Union. 
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  The practice of EU intervention in the regulation  
of electronic communications 
After having dealt with the legal and economic criteria justifying EU 
intervention, we now assess whether those criteria have been applied in 
practice by the EU institutions. In the first sub-section, we deal with cases 
where EU intervention has been over-intrusive, whereas in the second sub-
section we deal with cases where EU intervention was justified. 
Some cases where EU intervention is not always justified 
The choice of remedies in the national market analysis 
According to the Framework Directive, the Commission may review NRA 
market analyses that could affect trade between Member States 16. Those 
are: 
"Measures that may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or 
potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in a manner 
which might create a barrier to the internal market. They comprise 
measures that have a significant impact on operators or users in other 
Member States, which include, inter alia: (i) measures which affect 
prices for users in other Member States;  (ii) measures which affect the 
ability of an undertaking established in another Member State to 
provide an electronic communications service, and in particular 
measures which affect the ability to offer services on a transnational 
basis; (iii) and measures which affect market structure or access, 
leading to repercussions for undertakings in other Member States." 17  
During this review, the Commission may comment and possibly, in a 
second stage, veto the market definition and the market power assessment 
in the NRA draft measure which would create a barrier to the single market 
or not be compatible with EU law 18. Moreover, where the Commission finds 
that divergences in the implementation by the NRAs of the regulatory tasks 
create a barrier to the internal market, the Commission may issue a 
recommendation or, regarding numbering and remedies in the market 
analysis, a binding decision on the harmonised application of the EU 
                     
16 Art. 7(3) of the amended Framework Directive 2002/21. 
17 Recital 38 of the original Framework Directive 2002/21. 
18 Art. 7(4) and (5) of the amended Framework Directive 2002/21. 
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provisions in order to further the achievement of the main objectives of the 
EU regulation (effective competition, internal market, citizens' interests) 19.  
In practice, the Commission adopts a very broad interpretation of the 
concept of "measures that could affect trade between Member States". It 
grants itself the competence to review all NRAs' draft market analyses 20 
without really investigating the effects on trade between Member States on a 
case by case basis. However, differences in regulatory regimes have never 
prevented the establishment of pan-European telephone calls or other forms 
of electronic communications, nor prevented cross-border takeovers across 
the European Union. It is somehow surprising that no Member State has 
ever challenged such extensive interpretation before the Court.  
Moreover during its review, the Commission in practice conducts a 
consistency check between the different approaches of the NRAs rather 
than an investigation into whether the differences between NRAs' measures 
are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms, and thus have a direct 
effect on the functioning of the internal market or to cause significant 
distortions of competition. In its last Report on the market review process, 21 
the Commission notes that:  
"Regulatory remedies still vary across Europe, even where the 
underlying market problems are very similar. This is a serious 
impediment to achieving a true single market." 
However, the Commission does not articulate a precise rationale why a 
divergence in remedies or regulatory approaches on markets defined as 
being national would necessarily affect trade between member States and 
impede the single market. 22 According to us, the Commission's view is too 
broad. From a legal point of view, it does not correspond to the legal 
reasonably restrained economic interpretation given by the Court of Justice 
on internal market provision. From an economic point of view, it does not 
correspond to the balancing test of the theory of fiscal federalism, in 
                     
19 Art. 19 of the amended Framework Directive 2002/21. 
20 See Commission Guidelines of 9 July 2002 on market analysis and the assessment of 
significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, OJ [2002] C 165/6, para. 147 stating that "the notion of 
an effect on trade between Member States is likely to cover a broad range of measures". So far, 
all NRAs draft decisions have been notified to the Commission for comments. 
21 Communication from the Commission of 1 June 2010 on market reviews under the EU 
Regulatory Framework (3rd Report), COM(2010) 271, p. 4. 
22 See also the Opinion of Advocate General Poaires Maduro in Case C-58/08, Roaming 
Regulation, para. 18. 
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particular because such broad interpretation does not allow regulatory 
experimentation. 23 
Obviously, the situation is different in the case of transnational markets 24 
where EU intervention is more easily justified. This is, for instance, the case 
for satellite communications which have a de facto pan-European footprint 
and the costs of serving one national zone or several ones are largely fixed. 
The 2008 Parliament and Council decision setting out a single selection 
procedure at EU level for Mobile satellite services (MSS) operators was a 
faltering step in the right direction. The selection is done by the Commission 
in coordination with Member States via Communications Committee. 
Following the selection procedure, operators should apply at national level 
for the right to use specific radio frequencies and the right to operate mobile 
satellite systems. In addition to frequency rights and authorisations, Member 
States should also grant to operators the authorisations to operate 
complementary ground components of mobile satellite systems on their 
territories. 25   
Trans-national market may also apply to the provision of services to 
'high-end' business users (typically multinational companies) which would 
perhaps benefit from a stronger EU intervention, as argued by some. 26 
However, it should be recalled that the majority of electronic communications 
markets remain national or regional, and that is not necessarily due to 
differences in national regulation but mainly to product characteristics (local 
infrastructures). 
                     
23 In this sense also, LAROUCHE & VISSER, 2006, stating that, "the Commission should 
intervene only when the draft measure proposed by an NRA is such that it will hamper the 
internal market (on the basis of concrete evidence) or that it will significantly conflict with 
Community law. A mere divergence of opinion between the Commission and the NRA (or 
between NRAs) is not sufficient to justify a Commission veto". 
24 Article 2(b) of the amended Framework Directive defines ‘transnational markets' as covering 
the Community or a substantial part thereof located in more than one Member State. For an 
assessment of the cost and benefits of an EU intervention on trans-national services, see 
European Evaluation Consortium, 2007, pp. 25-27 and 31-33. 
25 Decision 626/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2008 on the 
selection and authorisation of systems providing mobile satellite services (MSS), O.J. [2008] L 
172/19, and Commission Decision 2009/449 of 13 May 2009 on the selection of operators of 
pan-European systems providing mobile satellite services (MSS), O.J. [2009] L149/65. The two 
operators selected are Solaris (joint venture between Eutelsat and SES) and EuropaSat 
(Inmarsat). Solaris Mobile is experiencing some technical problems which limit the bit rate on 
the uplink. Europasat satellite is still being built. Consequently perhaps, 21 of the 27 Member 
States have failed to grant Solaris and EuropaSat a licence. 
26 BEREC Report of February 2011 on relevant market definition for business services, BoR 
(10) Rev1. 
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A first specific application on regulatory remedies:  
the regulation of the Mobile Termination Rates 
The argument is often heard that Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs) vary 
from country to country by several hundred percent and that this is evidence 
of widely diverging national policies which would undermine the internal 
market (See, among others, PELKMANS & RENDA, 2011).   
We submit first that national policies are not widely divergent. All Member 
States have followed the same policies of imposing glide paths for MTRs. In 
2000, MTRs spread between 15 and 25 eurocents; as of July 2010, the 
weighted average was 5.65 eurocents and existing glide paths suggest most 
countries will be below 3 eurocents by 2014. So it is very much the same 
policy that is applied over the European Union, with only the speed of the 
adjustment varying from country to country. There is a consensus among 
NRAs on the need to reduce MTRs and it is possible that the Commission 
via its review on regulator market analysis has contributed to this.  
We submit then that divergences among Member States may be justified 
and should be policed by the Commission. A number of NRAs have and are 
still setting higher MTRs in favour of late entrants on the markets. The 
Commission has for a long time opposed asymmetric MTRs, describing it as 
entry assistance, interfering unduly with market forces.  
Yet in a number of markets, such as France and the UK, in spite of the 
asymmetry in MTRs, late entrants on the markets have been net out payers 
of MTRs to early entrants. This is due to the existence of on-net retail prices. 
Consumers prefer larger operators so that a higher proportion of their calls is 
covered by on-net retail prices. This so-called 'club effect' is magnified by the 
gap between costs and the MTRs. This creates an artificial handicap for the 
smaller operators and creates a vicious circle: the smaller their market 
share, the less attractive their offerings. This forces late entrants to offer all-
net prices to increase the attractiveness of their offerings. This means that a 
late entrant's clients are indifferent between on-net and off-net calling, while 
an early entrant's clients tend to avoid off-net calls. This results in a traffic 
imbalance and a net out payment from the late to the early entrants. This is 
the justification brought forward by regulators defending an asymmetry of 
MTRs. The Commission is unconvinced and argues that the market share of 
a given mobile operator is a variable under its control. To consolidate its 
position, the Commission has adopted, against the majority of the Member 
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States, a non-binding recommendation on the regulation of fixed and mobile 
termination. 27 The Commission states that, to determine the minimum 
efficient scale for the purposes of the cost model, and taking account of 
market share developments in a number of EU Member States, the 
recommended approach is to set that scale at 20% market share. 
Furthermore, even the Commission acknowledges that asymmetry can be 
justified for a period of up to four years after market entry.  
Mobile Challengers, the association for late entrants on mobile markets, 
point out that there are very few, if any, examples of a number 3 or 4 entrant 
in an EU market ever gaining the second largest market share in revenues. 
Therefore, a longer transition period is needed in the interest of long term 
competition. This raises the question of how long that transitional period 
could reasonably be. Mobile Challengers is asking for asymmetry of MTRs 
as long as MTRs are set above costs 28.  
The Commission justified its intervention to ensure legal certainty and the 
right incentives for potential investors. 29 However, the discussion above 
shows that there are two schools of thought, 30 with valid arguments on both 
sides, hence regulatory experimentation by Member States is justified. 
Moreover, there are no counterbalancing arguments justifying EU regulation 
as it is hard to see why a difference of 25% in the MTRs of two mobile 
operators in the same country aimed at balancing interconnecting payments 
could have a material effect on the internal market. Similarly, Haucap 
(2009b:30) states that: 
"It is simply unrealistic to assume that the regulation of MTRs would be 
used as a tool of strategic regulatory policy by NRAs. Hence, cross-
border externalities provide no economic justification for harmonising 
MTR regulation at a European level." 
Thus, we argue that the Commission call for symmetry of MTRs in that 
Recommendation is not justified because its benefits are very small (in terms 
                     
27 Commission Recommendation 2009/396 of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of 
Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, O.J. [2009] L 124/67. The result of the vote at 
the Communications Committee of 18 February 2009 was: 12 Member States against, 10 
abstentions, and 5 in favour. 
28 See http://www.mobilechallengers.eu/images/stories/Barcelona09presentation.pdf 
29 Recital 4 of the Recommendation 2009/396 on the Regulatory Treatment of Termination 
Rates. 
30 For a summary of the debate in the economic literature on the regulation of MTR, see 
HAUCAP, 2009, p. 31. 
P. DEFRAIGNE & A. de STREEL 77 
of cross-country externalities, or economies of scale/savings of transaction 
costs), but its costs may be high (complicated system, no possibility of 
regulatory experimentation by Member States). 31 
A second specific application of regulatory remedies: Next-Generation Access 
Networks and the migration between copper and fibre - pricing 
The current debate on the relative prices of copper and fibre loops 
provides another good illustration of a field where several schools of thought 
exist and where there can be room for national preferences and 
experimentation. There will be a form of platform competition between 
copper-based current generation access (CGA) and fibre-based next 
generation access (NGA). Regulated wholesale prices will be one important 
factor influencing the pace of the migration from CGA to NGA. At this stage, 
the European Commission and many national regulators are unclear as to 
whether lower CGA prices (resulting from a different regime of cost 
accounting) would speed up fibre roll-out as argued by ECTA (the trade 
association presenting alternative operators) (HOERNIG et al., 2011) or 
whether, on the contrary, stable or even higher copper prices (resulting from 
fewer customers sharing the fixed costs of CGA) would drive customers to 
NGA, as argued by ETNO (the trade association representing the incumbent 
operators) (WILLIAMSON, BLACK & WILBY, 2011). The implementation of 
cost orientation implies decisions at four different levels. Furthermore, at 
each level, several options exist: 
- cost source, e.g. top down (based on the actual accounting of the 
operator) or bottom up (engineering model);  
- cost base, e.g. Fully Distributed Costs (FDC), Stand Alone Costs 
(SACs) Long Run Incremental Costing (LRIC); 
- depreciation method, e.g. historical costs (HCA), current costs (CCA); 
and 
- price control type, e.g. cost orientation, retail minus. 
For CGA, in its 2009 recommendation on termination rates, the 
Commission has advocated a precise combination of bottom up, LRIC, 
current costs with a price control based on cost orientation. 32 In its 2010 
                     
31 IRG/ERG Response of September 2008 to Public Consultation on Termination Rates, 
ERG(08) 31 rev1 stating that: "the development of the internal market […] is best achieved by 
ensuring that national decisions are taken on the basis of shared principles, rather than 
requiring uniformity in the fine detail of the regulatory approach". 
32 Commission Recommendation 2009/396 on the Regulatory Treatment of Termination Rates. 
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recommendation on NGA, the Commission wisely refrains from being too 
specific and simply refers to cost orientation. 33 In the absence of a 
reasonable consensus, the Commission was right to leave each NRA free to 
pursue the policy which, they believe, will foster investment in NGA in their 
own country. In view of the relative uncertainty of the optimal combination of 
cost accounting concepts and on the assumption that all NRAs are really 
pursuing competition, we submit that the Commission should not issue 
similar strict guidance on fibre – in particular on the relative prices of fibre 
and copper - as part of its upcoming recommendation on cost methodologies 
for key access products.  
Cases where EU intervention is justified 
The regulation of market entry 
Home-country control procedures are an extension of the Cassis de Dijon 
doctrine 34 to services. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the extension of 
the doctrine to services was seen in many sectors ranging from audiovisual 
to electronic commerce services. 35 In the field of electronic communications 
services, the Commission tabled in 1992 a proposal for a mutual recognition 
of licences whereby a telecommunications operator duly authorised in its 
home country would be authorised to provide services in other Member 
States. However, the initiative was strongly opposed by the Member States. 
Therefore in 1994, the Commission proposed another option which was to 
harmonise national licensing conditions. Since licensing conditions would 
have been the same in every Member State, operators would have been 
able to operate across borders without obstacles. After an unsuccessful 
attempt by the European Telecommunications Office – a CEPT body based 
in Copenhagen – to harmonise licences, the idea was abandoned.  
                     
33 Commission Recommendation 2010/572 of 20 September 2010 on regulated access to Next 
Generation Access Networks (NGA), O.J. [2010] L 251/3. On the additional national flexibility 
given by each iteration of the Recommendation, see CAVE & SHORTALL, 2010. 
34 Named after the Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral c. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 
ECR [1979] 649. 
35 Directive 2007/65 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television 
broadcasting activities, OJ [2007] L 332/27; Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ [2000] L 178/1, Art. 3. 
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In November 1995, the Commission tabled a third proposal which led to 
the adoption of Directive 97/13. 36 The approach was to try to limit the range 
of conditions that Member States could impose on operators to what is 
strictly needed to ensure consumer protection, network integrity, security of 
staff, prevention of anti-competitive behaviours, measures for disabled 
people... The same approach was taken over in the current Authorisation 
Directive. 37 In practice, the cost for industry of having that third option is 
probably not much higher than having a regime of mutual recognition or a 
fully harmonised regime. This is because the procedure for obtaining an 
authorisation has become much lighter than in the early 2000s. Furthermore, 
compliance costs would be relatively equal under the three regimes since it 
is anyway the responsibility of each national regulator to undertake the 
surveillance of its own market.   
International roaming 
Beyond unregulated competitive offerings by individual companies' 
initiatives such as Vodafone Passport, the industry failed to propose a 
market-based solution to meet the concerns of consumers and politicians 
about high retail roaming prices for voice telephony and SMS in the EU. 
Thus in June 2007, a binding regulation setting ceiling prices at both retail 
and wholesale level for international mobile roaming voice calls was adopted 
by the European Parliament and the Council. 38 The validity of this 
regulation, and more generally the validity of intervention at the EU level, 
was confirmed by the Court of Justice in June 2010. The Court 39 judged 
that the International Roaming Regulation was justified because divergent 
national policies would have targeted the retail level and would have caused 
distortions of competition among operators: 
"47. As regards the functioning of the roaming market […] and taking 
into consideration the considerable interdependence of retail and 
wholesale charges for roaming services, it is clear that a divergent 
                     
36 Directive 97/13 of the European Parliament and of Council of 10 April 1997 on a common 
framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications 
services, OJ [1997] L 117/15. 
37 Directive 2002/20 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services OJ [2002] L 108/21, as 
amended by Directive 2009/140. 
38 Regulation 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2007 on 
roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and amending Directive 
2002/21/EC, OJ [2007] L 171/32, as amended by Regulation 544/2009. 
39 Case C 58/08, International Roaming Regulation, para.47. 
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development of national laws seeking to lower retail charges only, 
without affecting the level of costs for the wholesale provision of 
Community-wide roaming services, would have been liable to cause 
significant distortions of competition and to disrupt the orderly 
functioning of the Community-wide roaming market […]" 
EU intervention is also justified on the basis of the economic criteria of 
the fiscal federalism as the regulation of international roaming is a typical 
case of direct externalities between countries. If a Member State caps prices 
for international roaming in its own territory, the beneficiaries are foreign 
consumers; while domestic mobile operators suffer as do domestic 
consumers since – in response to a decrease in roaming revenues – other 
mobile telecommunications prices may increase or handset subsidies 
decrease due to the waterbed effect (HAUCAP, 2009a, p. 471). 40 While 
acknowledging the 'dirigiste' approach of the International Roaming 
Regulation and its departure from the market-based approach promoted by 
the EU for other electronic communications services, it is fair to recognise 
that competition in this sector has so far failed. The industry seems to have 
learned the lesson and a number of attractive commercial offerings have 
recently been launched on the mobile data side. 
Spectrum 
Another example of an appropriate EU intervention is the recently 
proposed decision on the Radio Spectrum Policy Program. 41 One of the 
RSPP's most important objectives is to make the 800 MHz band available for 
wireless broadband by January 2013. In May 2010, the Commission 
adopted a Decision 42 setting harmonised technical conditions for the use of 
the 800 MHz band for non-broadcasting services, in particular for wireless 
broadband services using 4G technologies (e.g. LTE). 43 The decision does 
                     
40 Such cross-countries externalities have been explicitly recognised by the Opinion of 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case 58/08 International Roaming Regulation, para. 27. 
The Advocate-General insists several times on the cross-border nature of roaming for the 
regulation to pass the legal basis and the subsidiarity test. 
41 Commission proposal of 20 September 2010 for a decision establishing the first radio 
spectrum policy programme COM (2010) 471. 
42 Commission Decision 2010/267 of 6 May 2010 on harmonised technical conditions of use in 
the 790-862 MHz frequency band for terrestrial systems capable of providing electronic 
communications services in the European Union, O.J. [2010] L 117/95. 
43 The 800 MHz (790-862 MHz) band is the upper part of the spectrum that will be freed up 
with the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial television broadcasting – the digital 
dividend. 
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not require Member States to open the 800 MHz band for non-broadcasting 
services but if/when a Member State does decide to, it must follow the 
technical conditions set by the Decision. The RSPP, however, would 
mandate the implementation of the decision to clear the 800 MHz band by 
January 2013. One of its main goals is to make spectrum available for 
wireless broadband services. We argue that the Commission's spectrum 
policy is justified because it aims at achieving economies of scale for 
network equipment and handsets, at minimising the problems of spectrum 
interference across borders and therefore at lowering costs that will benefit 
consumers.   
  Conclusion 
To conclude, we submit that the internal market for electronic 
communications should be fostered as its benefits to the EU economy and 
its citizens far exceed the 2.8% of the EU GDP represented by the electronic 
communications sector. However, we call for a thorough and open debate 
on the definition of what constitutes the achievement of the internal market 
and the appropriate policies at the national and EU level. Today, there are 
divergent views but no real debate on the conditions required to achieve the 
internal market.  
Europe needs to define more precisely when EU intervention is justified 
and when it is not. It needs to define more clearly which national policies 
constitute an unacceptable fragmentation of the internal market and what is 
merely the expression of national preferences and choices without any 
material impact on European welfare. It should do that on the basis of the 
legal criteria (the legal basis test – Article 114 TFEU- and the subsidiarity 
test). As the legal criteria give some flexibility, they may, for efficiency 
reason, be fine tuned with the criteria provided by the mainstream economic 
theory of fiscal federalism.  
We submit that fostering the internal market for electronic 
communications does not mean that the EU law should address all 
regulatory issues. Any EU intervention, instead of national intervention, 
should focus on the areas where its benefits are the highest, in particular 
given the possibilities of economies of scale provided by the technology or 
cross-country externalities, and where its costs are the lowest, in particular 
given the heterogeneity of national preferences and choices or the need to 
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allow for regulatory experimentation. On that basis, we submit that EU 
intervention should be concentrated inter alia on spectrum policy, pan-
European services (e.g. satellite communications) and international mobile 
roaming. 44 . In particular, the European Parliament and the Council should 
agree towards more harmonisation for spectrum policy in the current 
negotiation process. Conversely, we submit that EU intervention is not 
justified for national market analysis, when there is little impact on the 
internal market or where there is uncertainty on the most appropriate 
regulatory approach. In particular, the Commission should use its new power 
on the choice of regulatory remedies with great care, showing each time why 
the choice of a particular remedy would affect trade between Member States 
and the internal market. Such care is particularly relevant regarding the 
regulation of Next Generation Networks where uncertainty remains on the 
appropriate regulatory approach to stimulate investment; hence regulatory 
experimentation would be useful. 45 In addition, the EU should provide 
support for small regulators which so request. 46 The regulatory framework 
is complex and regulators in small countries do not necessarily have the 
resources to meet their duty. That problem will become even more acute 
with the next wave of accession countries (i.e. Balkans countries).  
The European legislative process has been the battleground for 
arbitrating the political debate on striking the balance between the EU and 
national regulation. But since the liberalisation of 1998, the battle has been 
more intellectual than political, with winning ideas trialled by the most 
innovative national regulators being subsequently implemented in other 
countries. Over the years, depending on the issues, specific Member States 
or sometimes the Commission itself have been in the driving seat in terms of 
generating new regulatory ideas. Because of that and because it has limited 
resources and political capital, the Commission should not seek to intervene 
on every regulatory issue, in particular in the absence of a reasonable 
consensus. A case in point is the upcoming Commission recommendations 
                     
44 Network security and standardisation are also cases for EU intervention according to the 
criteria of fiscal federalism. 
45 More generally, we submit that EU intervention is more relevant for the content part of digital 
regulation (such as copyright, privacy, electronic commerce, dispute resolution) than for the 
infrastructure part (i.e. the electronic communications networks and services), as the former is 
based on tradable goods whereas the latter is mainly based on local non-tradable goods. 
46 This is in line with Article 16(7) of the amended Framework Directive 2002/21, and Article 
3(1c) of the Regulation 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) and the Office, OJ [2009] L 337/1. More generally, see the new Art. 197 TFUE on 
administrative cooperation. 
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on cost methodologies for key access products which would cover NGA 
pricing. Instead, the European Commission should concentrate its action on 
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